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MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE  
AMICUS CURIAE BRIEF 
 Pursuant to Rule 37 of the Rules of this Court, 
Amici National Association for Public Defense and 
Kentucky Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers re-
spectfully request leave to file the accompanying Ami-
cus Curiae brief in support of the petition for writ of 
certiorari in the above-referenced case.  
 All parties were timely notified of the intent of 
these Amici to file the attached brief as required by 
Rule 37.2(a). Respondents declined to give consent. 
 In this case, the Kentucky Supreme Court incor-
rectly held that a state evidentiary rule should totally 
foreclose a criminal defendant’s opportunity to present 
his best case in opening argument. This holding is of 
critical interest to Amici, organizations that represent 
criminal defense counsel who regularly practice in the 
state of Kentucky. Amici have a particular and sub-
stantial interest in ensuring that the Sixth and Four-
teenth Amendment rights of all criminal defendants 
are protected. 
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 Accordingly, Amici respectfully request that the 
Court grant the motion for leave to file an Amicus Cu-
riae brief. 
Respectfully submitted, 
L. JOE DUNMAN 
 Counsel of Record 
DANIEL J. CANON 
SAMUEL A. MARCOSSON 
UNIVERSITY OF LOUISVILLE  
 BRANDEIS SCHOOL OF LAW 
 BRANDEIS IMPACT  
 LITIGATION PRACTICUM 
2301 South Third Street 
Louisville, KY 40292 
(502) 208-2055 
joe@joedunmanlaw.com 
Counsel for Amici Curiae 
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QUESTIONS PRESENTED 
 
 
1. Whether Kentucky’s rule prohibiting counsel from 
characterizing the credibility of the complaining 
witness violates a criminal defendant’s constitu-
tional right to present a complete defense 
grounded in the Due Process, Confrontation, and 
Compulsory Process Clauses. 
2. Whether a manifest necessity for a mistrial ex-
isted when the basis for the mistrial was counsel’s 
attempts to describe the defense, i.e., that the com-
plaining witness was lying when she accused the 
defendant of sexual abuse. 
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INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE1 
 The National Association for Public Defense 
(NAPD) is an association of more than 14,000 profes-
sionals who deliver the right to counsel throughout all 
U.S. states and territories. NAPD members include at-
torneys, investigators, social workers, administrators, 
and other support staff who strive to fulfill the consti-
tutional right to counsel through zealous, client- 
centered representation. NAPD members are advo-
cates in jails, in courtrooms, and in communities and 
understand both theoretical best practices and how to 
apply them in the day-to-day delivery of defense ser-
vices. Their collective knowledge and skill is at work in 
state, county, and local systems through full-time, con-
tract, and assigned counsel delivery mechanisms, 
through dedicated juvenile, capital and appellate of-
fices, and through a diversity of traditional and holistic 
practice models. NAPD provides webinar-based and 
live training programs that emphasize the utmost im-
portance of providing vigorous defense advocacy across 
all phases of representation as contemplated by funda-
mental constitutional due process and Sixth Amend-
ment guarantees. Those phases include opening 
statements that forecast the centrality of witness cred-
ibility to the defense theory of a case. Accordingly, 
 
 1 No counsel for a party authored this brief in whole or in 
part. No one other than Amici Curiae, its members or Amici’s 
counsel made a monetary contribution intended to fund the prep-
aration or submission of this brief. Counsel of record for all parties 
received notice at least ten days prior to the due date of Amici’s 
intention to file this brief. A Motion for Leave to File Brief for 
Amicus Curiae is attached. 
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NAPD has a strong interest in the issue raised in this 
case. 
 The Kentucky Association of Criminal Defense 
Lawyers (KACDL) is a non-profit organization com-
posed of attorneys who practice criminal law in the 
Kentucky Court of Justice. The attorney members and 
their clients are directly affected by the Kentucky Su-
preme Court’s decision to categorically prohibit a di-
rect statement of the defense during opening 
statement where the defense to criminal charges is 
that a witness is lying. The Association views the opin-
ion of the Supreme Court of Kentucky as a serious in-
fringement on the federal constitutional right to 
present a complete defense and foresees the disastrous 
effect the opinion will have on members’ obligation to 
provide effective representation in criminal prosecu-
tions conducted in Kentucky. 
---------------------------------  --------------------------------- 
 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
 By silencing criminal defense lawyers during 
opening statement – the crucial first opportunity to 
present the defense theory of the case – the Kentucky 
Supreme Court has imposed dangerous limitations on 
rights guaranteed under the Sixth and Fourteenth 
Amendments. More specifically, by misapplying an ev-
identiary rule designed to check prosecutorial miscon-
duct, those courts have eliminated the crucial first 
opportunity of criminal defendants to alert jurors that 
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the sole issue in a case is the credibility of the com-
plaining witness. This radical restriction on defense 
advocacy does not merely fly in the face of broad con-
sensus among courts and commentators on the crucial 
role of the opening statement in setting a framework 
for juror comprehension of what they are about to see 
and hear during trial. The decisions of the Kentucky 
courts strike a harsh and fundamentally unfair blow 
against defendants’ due process rights to be heard as 
well as their rights to confront the witnesses against 
them and to present a defense. Denying defendants the 
opportunity to highlight the single factual question 
upon which their liberty turns is antithetical to our 
system of adversarial fact finding. For the foregoing 
reasons, this Court should grant certiorari and reverse.  
---------------------------------  --------------------------------- 
 
ARGUMENT 
 This Court should grant certiorari and hold that 
the Supreme Court of Kentucky violated the Sixth and 
Fourteenth Amendments by misapplying an eviden-
tiary rule to prevent defense counsel from using open-
ing statement to highlight the credibility of the 
complaining witness as the sole issue in this case.  
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I. Opening statements are a long-standing, 
crucial component of the trial process and 
of a criminal defendant’s constitutionally-
protected presentation of a complete de-
fense.  
 This Court has recognized a resolute principle in 
our constitutional system: “The right of an accused in 
a criminal trial to due process is, in essence, the right 
to a fair opportunity to defend against the State’s ac-
cusations.” Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 294 
(1973). Traditionally, that opportunity to defend has 
included an opening statement. As this case demon-
strates, fundamental rights secured under the Sixth 
and Fourteenth Amendments are implicated where, as 
here, a criminal defendant seeks to use opening state-
ment to forecast his challenge to the credibility of the 
complaining witness as the sole issue in the case. This 
Court should bring much-needed clarity to this area of 
law by correcting the Kentucky Supreme Court’s con-
stitutional error.  
 Opening statements have been “long accepted as 
established and traditional in jury trials.” United 
States v. Stanfield, 521 F.2d 1122, 1125 (9th Cir. 1975); 
Garner v. State, 374 P.2d 525, 528 (1962) (“After the 
jury has been selected and sworn, every criminal trial 
has three phases – the opening statement, the proof 
and the summation.”). The opportunity to make an 
opening statement is ingrained in our adversarial pro-
cess because it is the first time that counsel can speak 
directly to the jury in a way that provides a framework 
for jurors to consider the evidence and issues that are 
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about to unfold in the courtroom. The Kentucky De-
partment of Public Advocacy’s nationally-renowned 
trial skills program focuses on the opening as a crucial 
phase in communicating defense theory. KENTUCKY DE-
PARTMENT OF PUBLIC ADVOCACY, KY DPA LITIGATION 
PERSUASION INSTITUTE: NEW AND ADVANCED PERSUASION 
LABORATORY, KDPA.gov, http://dpa.ky.gov/who_we_are/ 
Education/Documents/LPI%20Schedule%202015.pdf.  
The American Bar Association recognizes the opening 
statement as a critical opportunity for counsel to  
develop a connection with jurors. AMERICAN BAR ASSO-
CIATION, OPENING STATEMENTS: GENERAL RULES AND GUIDE- 
LINES, ABA.org, http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/ 
aba/administrative/litigation/materials/2012-aviation/ 
2012-aviation-opening-statements-general-rules-guidelines. 
authcheckdam.pdf.  
 This Court acknowledged more than eighty years 
ago that opening statements can make or break a case. 
Best v. District of Columbia, 291 U.S. 411 (1934) (trial 
court may direct verdict based solely on opening state-
ment). There is truth in the conventional wisdom that 
one does not get a second chance to make a first im-
pression. “[T]he jury forms its first and often lasting 
impression of the case” during the opening. Common-
wealth v. Montgomery, 626 A.2d 109, 113 (1993). See 
also Maleh v. Fla. E. Coast Props., Inc., 491 So. 2d 290, 
291 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986); Binegar v. Day, 120 
N.W.2d 521, 525 (1963) (“At this stage of the trial, the 
jury is peculiarly alert and impressionable.”). And ac-
ademics concur: the opening statement is crucial be-
cause it establishes the framework through which the 
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jury will view the evidence as it is revealed throughout 
the rest of the trial. Ty Alper et al., Stories Told and 
Untold: Lawyering Theory Analyses of the First Rodney 
King Assault Trial, 12 CLIN. L. REV. 1, 19 (2005).  
 The theory of primacy proposes that “people best 
remember things they hear first.” John L. Calcagni III, 
Esq., Contesting the Constitutionality of Restricting 
Criminal Defendant Opening Statements, 53 Feb. 
R.I.B.J. 5, 8 (January/February 2005). Repeated stud-
ies have demonstrated that overwhelming majorities 
of jurors and jury verdicts are strongly affected by 
opinions formed during opening statement. See, e.g., 
S.S. Diamond et al., Juror Reactions to Attorneys at 
Trial, 87 J. CRIM L. & CRIMINOLOGY 17, 27 (1996) (70% 
of jurors formed opinions on the appropriate verdict 
following opening statements and retained those opin-
ions through the end of the trial); H.P. Weld & E.R. 
Danzig, A Study of the Way in Which a Verdict is 
Reached by a Jury, 53 AM. J. PSYCHOLOGY 518, 529, 532 
(1940) (70-90% of jurors’ final verdicts were consistent 
with their opinions during opening statements).  
 Lawyers use opening statements to present the 
evidence in such a way that jurors can easily under-
stand how it is connected and the implications that can 
be drawn from those connections. United States v. Di-
nitz, 424 U.S. 600, 612 (1976) (Burger, C.J., concurring). 
A well-executed opening also presents the evidence in 
the most compelling way possible, that is, through a 
strong narrative framework to suggest how the evi-
dence leads to a specific result. Weyman I. Lundquist, 
Advocacy in Opening Statements, 8 LITIG. 23 (Spring 
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1982). A strong narrative structure, consisting of de-
tails and coding, paints a vivid picture in the juror’s 
mind. Alper et al., 12 CLIN. L. REV. at 15. Coding is the 
psychological “process by which words, images, objects, 
and ideas become associatively linked with others, so 
that the former bring the latter to mind.” Id. The goal 
is to create “strong mental images that will endure 
throughout the trial.” Gerald Reading Powell, Opening 
Statements: The Art of Storytelling, 31 STETSON L. REV. 
89, 90 (2001).  
 These cases, academic studies, and performance 
guidelines demonstrate that the opening statement is 
a crucial component of any full and competent defense, 
a right which the Sixth Amendment protects. Unfortu-
nately, a lack of guidance from this Court made it pos-
sible for the Supreme Court of Kentucky to eviscerate 
that component. The Court should seize this oppor-
tunity to clarify the law by vindicating the criminal  
defendant’s right to alert jurors during opening state-
ment that the credibility of the complaining witness is 
the sole issue upon which the defendant’s liberty de-
pends.  
 
II. This Court should resolve conflicts among 
state and federal courts regarding whether 
a trial judge can impede the ability of a de-
fendant to assert his only plausible defense 
during opening statements.  
 This Court has offered no specific guidance on 
whether a trial court may limit the scope of an opening 
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argument so as to effectively bar a criminal defen- 
dant’s only plausible defense. But this Court has said 
that, “an essential component of procedural fairness is 
an opportunity to be heard,” and thus, “the Constitu-
tion guarantees criminal defendants a meaningful op-
portunity to present a complete defense.” Crane v. 
Kentucky, 476 U.S. 684, 690 (1986). “A person’s right to 
. . . an opportunity to be heard in his defense – a right 
to his day in court – are basic in our system of juris-
prudence; and these rights include, as a minimum, a 
right to examine the witnesses against him, to offer 
testimony, and to be represented by counsel.” In re Ol-
iver, 333 U.S. 257, 268 (1948).  
 The Constitution explicitly ensures to a person ac-
cused of a crime the opportunity to confront the wit-
nesses brought against him. U.S. Const. Amend. VI. In 
Olden v. Kentucky, 488 U.S. 227 (1988), this Court held 
that a trial court misapplied a state evidentiary rule to 
violate the Confrontation Clause when the trial judge 
prevented a defendant from “ ‘[exposing] to the jury the 
facts from which jurors . . . could appropriately draw 
inferences relating to the reliability of the witness’ ” on 
cross examination. Id. at 231 (quoting Delaware v. Van 
Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 680 (1986)). These fundamental 
constitutional principles, rooted in the universal prom-
ise of fairness for all criminal defendants, are directly 
contravened by the Kentucky Supreme Court’s misap-
plication of yet another evidentiary rule in the case at 
bar.  
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A. State and Federal Courts are in conflict 
regarding the degree to which a trial 
judge may regulate the presentation of 
a defense in opening statements. 
 Though it is true that “the weight of authority in 
the federal courts and in the states has either granted 
or implied that a criminal defendant has a basic right 
to make an opening statement” under the Sixth 
Amendment, this Court has yet to explicitly address 
the issue despite conflicting approaches in state and 
federal courts over the scope of judicial discretion in 
regulating the content of defendants’ opening state-
ments. Richard W. Lewis, Comment: Opening State-
ment: A Constitutional Right?, 7 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 
623 (1984).  
 In United States. v. Doyle, 121 F.3d 1078, 1093 (7th 
Cir. 1997), the Seventh Circuit held that a district 
court abused its discretion by preventing a criminal 
defendant’s attorney from referencing prosecutorial 
misconduct in opening arguments but allowing the de-
fense to argue regarding the reliability of a govern-
ment witness. The court determined that Doyle was 
“certainly entitled to present a defense which was 
based on attacking the credibility” of a government 
witness. Id. at 1094. The court concluded that, though 
the district court acted within its discretion in limiting 
the scope of opening arguments regarding a collateral 
issue of prosecutorial misconduct, the trial judge would 
have been foreclosed from barring counsel from articu-
lating the primary elements of their defense. Id. 
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 Doyle represents the proper exercise of judicial 
discretion in the regulation of opening statements by 
honoring the fundamental interests protected by the 
Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. Implicit in the 
Seventh Circuit’s Doyle decision is the underlying 
principle that a defendant’s sole defense cannot be 
barred from opening statements, particularly when 
that defense turns entirely on attacking the credibility 
of key government witnesses. Id. at 1093 (“Doyle was 
certainly entitled to present a defense which was based 
on attacking the credibility of the cooperating [prose-
cution] witnesses and illustrating their bias or motive 
to fabricate.”). While the Doyle holding provides some 
room for judicial discretion in narrowing the parame-
ters of opening statements at trial, it proscribes a trial 
judge from totally denying a defendant her constitu-
tional rights to be heard and to mount a meaningful 
challenge to the credibility of prosecution witnesses.  
 Other federal courts have ruled similarly. The 
First Circuit robustly affirmed the critical importance 
of the criminal defendant’s opening statement by en-
shrining it in its own rules and holding that “a defen- 
dant in a criminal case has a right to make an opening 
regardless of whether he intends to call witnesses, and 
may do so immediately after the prosecutor’s opening, 
absent good cause shown to the contrary.” United 
States v. Hershenow, 680 F.2d 847, 858 (1st Cir. 1982). 
The Ninth Circuit also expressly acknowledged that 
the opening statement is a “well established and prac-
tical custom” in criminal jury trials, which “should be 
continued in the district courts of this circuit.” United 
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States v. Stanfield, 521 F.2d 1122, 1125 (9th Cir. 1975). 
By contrast, the Second Circuit has held that an open-
ing statement is subject to the court’s discretion. 
United States v. Salovitz, 701 F.2d 17, 21 (2d Cir. 1983) 
(“We believe that an opening statement by the defend-
ant is not such a guaranteed right, and that the mak-
ing and timing of opening statements can be left 
constitutionally to the informed discretion of the trial 
judge.”).  
 Similarly, state courts disagree as to whether 
opening statements should be guaranteed by right or 
by custom, or whether they may be circumscribed if 
criminal defendants seek to challenge witness credibil-
ity. Like the Seventh Circuit, the Missouri Supreme 
Court recently upheld the right to a defense opening 
statement that questions the credibility of prosecuto-
rial witnesses. State v. Thompson, 68 S.W.3d 393, 395 
(Mo. 2002). Even though “the scope of opening state-
ments is within the discretion of the trial court,” the 
Thompson court held, “an absolute ban on reference to 
all cross-examination testimony denies the defendant 
. . . the right to an opening statement.” Id. (emphasis 
added). 
 The Idaho Supreme Court, by contrast, has held 
that “opening remarks should be confined to a brief 
summary of evidence counsel expects to introduce,” 
and counsel “should not at that time attempt to im-
peach or otherwise argue the merits of the evidence 
that the opposing side has or will present.” State v. 
Griffith, 97 Idaho 52, 56, 539 P.2d 604, 608 (1975). 
Here, the Kentucky Supreme Court similarly held that 
12 
 
defense counsel may not use an opening statement to 
present the theory of the case that the complaining 
witness is “lying or faking,” nor may they even offer a 
framework for jurors to view the evidence as support-
ing any “conclusions about the credibility of a witness” 
in opening statements. Sneed v. Burress, 500 S.W.3d 
791, 795 (Ky. 2016), reh’g denied (Oct. 20, 2016).  
 These conflicting conceptions of opening state-
ments and their intersections with fundamental con-
stitutional guarantees create gaps in the Sixth 
Amendment’s protection of criminal defendants from 
jurisdiction to jurisdiction, both state and federal. 
Those gaps are particularly dangerous where, as here, 
trial courts accept prosecution arguments that “give no 
effect to the details” of core rights that the Framers de-
signed to check the concentrated exercise of govern-
ment power against the individual. United States v. 
Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 145 (2006). Prior deci-
sions of this Court have consistently rejected the mis-
application of evidentiary rules to truncate core 
constitutional rights. See, e.g., Crawford v. Washington, 
541 U.S. 36 (2004); see also Olden v. Kentucky, 488 U.S. 
at 231 (evidentiary rules cannot trump defendants’ op-
portunity to challenge the reliability of witnesses). 
This Court should grant certiorari and resolve the con-
flict among state and federal courts over a defendant’s  
right to use the opening statement to present his the-
ory of the case when that theory turns on the reliability 
of the complaining witness. Any other response from 
this Court will only compound the inequity in the  
application of the fundamental principle that every 
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criminal defendant has a right to present his whole de-
fense and a right to confront his accuser.  
 
B. The unconstitutional denial of a crimi-
nal defendant’s first, crucial oppor-
tunity to frame the issues in his case will 
increase the risk of false convictions.  
 The Kentucky Supreme Court’s attack on criminal 
defendants’ procedural and constitutional rights cre-
ates serious new risks of wrongful conviction, particu-
larly in cases involving rape and sexual assault. The 
misapplication of evidentiary rules turns regulation of 
the criminal trial upside down by chilling counsel’s at-
tempts to assert a defense in opening statement and 
impermissibly restricting the opportunity to raise rea-
sonable doubt regarding the central question upon 
which the defendant’s liberty turns.  
 The subversion of these procedural and constitu-
tional protections heightens the risk of wrongful con-
victions in rape and sexual assault cases. Only 19% of 
police investigations in rape and sexual assault cases 
lead to the collection of physical evidence. Michael 
Planty et al., FEMALE VICTIMS OF SEXUAL VIOLENCE, 
1994-2010, 7 (2016) https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/ 
pdf/fvsv9410.pdf. Because physical evidence in sex 
crime cases is rare, prosecutors and defense counsel of-
ten rely exclusively on witness testimony. In the vast 
majority of cases, the only viable path forward for a de-
fendant in a rape or sexual assault case is to draw the 
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veracity of the accuser and other key witnesses into 
doubt.  
 By precluding criminal defendants from informing 
jurors in opening statement of the defense theory that 
a witness is lying, the Kentucky Supreme Court also 
has ratcheted up the already overwhelming pressures 
on defendants to plead guilty in cases which should  
be properly tried before a jury. See, e.g., Marie 
Gottschalk, CAUGHT: THE PRISON STATE AND THE LOCK-
DOWN OF AMERICAN POLITICS 266-67 (Princeton Univ. 
Press 2015); William J. Stuntz, THE COLLAPSE OF AMER-
ICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 58-59 (Belknap Press 2011). In 
particular, allowing this rule to stand will result in yet 
more guilty pleas from innocent men and women. See 
Stuntz, supra; see also Lucian E. Dervan & Vanessa A. 
Edkins, Criminal Law: The Innocent Defendant’s Di-
lemma: An Innovative Empirical Study of Plea Bar-
gaining’s Innocence Problem, 103 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 1 (2013). The National Registry of Exon-
erations (NROE), which collects information about all 
known exonerations of innocent criminal defen- 
dants in the United States from 1989 to present, has 
concluded that in non-drug cases, 10% of exonerations 
include guilty pleas. Innocents Who Plead Guilty,  
NATIONAL REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS (Nov. 24, 2015) 
https://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Documents/ 
NRE.Guilty.Plea.Article1.pdf (last visited Mar. 7, 2017). The 
NROE also concludes that 8% (37/466) of all sexual as-
sault exonerations included an innocent person plead-
ing guilty. Id. It stands to reason that silencing a 
defendant who is attempting to use the crucial phase 
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of opening statement to inform jurors of his only de-
fense – a challenge to the credibility of the complaining 
witness – will result in an increased incidence of 
wrongful conviction via both trial and plea agreement.  
 The Kentucky case of Ben Kiper, which has trou-
bling similarities to the instant case, illustrates the 
devastating effects of false witness testimony. Ben 
Kiper, NATIONAL REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS (Nov. 24, 
2015), (AUG. 26, 2014), https://www.law.umich.edu/special/ 
exoneration/Pages/casedetail.aspx?caseid=3353. Like 
Petitioner Sneed, Kiper had been charged with sexual 
abuse crimes against his stepdaughter, and was con-
victed with no accompanying physical evidence or any 
other evidence besides testimony that the abuse had 
occurred. Id. After alleging sexual abuse at a custody 
hearing between her mother and father, Kiper’s step-
daughter eventually told providers in a children’s hos-
pital that her accusations were false. Kiper served six 
years in prison for a crime he did not commit. Id. 
Kiper’s ordeal underscores the tenuous nature of con-
victions that turn solely on uncorroborated “he-said-
she-said” evidence. If defense counsel can challenge the 
veracity of an accuser from the beginning of a trial, the 
trier of fact will have a better opportunity to consider 
all relevant factors prior to conviction. This Court 
should mitigate the risk of wrongful convictions by 
granting certiorari and reversing the decision of the 
Kentucky Supreme Court in this case.  
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III. This case presents a perfect vehicle to clar-
ify and protect the Sixth and Fourteenth 
Amendment rights of criminal defendants. 
 This case presents the Court with an excellent op-
portunity to resolve an important constitutional issue: 
whether, under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments, criminal defendants have a right to present 
their best defense in their opening statements. The 
new legal rule established by the Kentucky Supreme 
Court has vastly diminished the right to effectively 
present a defense. When the prosecution relies only on 
complaining witness testimony, as is often the case, 
this rule leaves a very large number of criminal de-
fendants with no effective means of defense.  
 Clarity is needed. This Court has rarely resolved 
issues arising from opening statements, and none to 
the extent necessary to provide guidance in cases such 
as this. In Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478 (1978), a 
robbery case which “essentially was a swearing contest 
between victim and accused,” this Court held that the 
“refusal to give petitioner’s requested instruction on 
the presumption of innocence resulted in a violation of 
his right to a fair trial as guaranteed by the Due Pro-
cess Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Id. at 487-
88, 490. In that case, the prosecution’s opening state-
ment repeatedly suggested that the defendant’s status 
as a defendant tended to establish guilt. Id. The Court 
found that the prosecution’s actions in the opening 
statement led to “possible harmful inferences . . . 
creat[ing] a genuine danger that the jury would convict 
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petitioner on the basis of those extraneous considera-
tions, rather than on the evidence introduced at trial.” 
Id. at 488. However, the Court never reached any con-
stitutional questions regarding the scope of opening 
statements or the proper role of opening statements in 
presenting the defense theory of the case.  
 In Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497 (1978), this 
Court found that where defense counsel made an im-
proper comment in opening statement, the trial judge 
had broad discretion to decide whether to give the jury 
a curative instruction or ultimately declare a mistrial. 
However, this Court has not decided whether this same 
rationale applies when the defendant’s only theory of 
the case is deemed to be improper, or whether the Sixth 
and Fourteenth Amendments can tolerate a rule fore-
closing any reference in opening statement to a de-
fense theory of the case that challenges the credibility 
of the complaining witness. 
 This Court has denied certiorari when similar 
questions have arisen but were complicated by other 
issues, or dealt with prosecutorial (rather than de-
fense) misconduct. See, e.g., United States v. Somers, 
496 F.2d 723, 738 (3d Cir.) (finding the prosecution’s 
use of “overly dramatic” and “unnecessary characteri-
zations” during opening statement with no subsequent 
supporting evidence should not lead to an automatic 
finding of misconduct), cert. denied, Somers v. U.S., 419 
U.S. 832 (1974); United States v. Leftwich, 461 F.2d 586, 
590 (3d Cir.) (“[t]rials are rarely, if ever, perfect and im-
proprieties of argument by counsel to the jury do not 
call for a new trial unless they are so gross as probably 
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to prejudice the defendant and the prejudice has not 
been neutralized by the trial judge before submission 
of the case to the jury.”), cert. denied, Wright v. U.S., 409 
U.S. 915 (1972); United States v. De Peri, 778 F.2d 963, 
978-79 (3d Cir. 1985) (finding “[a]s long as the opening 
statement avoids references to matters that cannot be 
proved or would be inadmissible, there can be no error, 
much less prejudicial error.”), cert. denied, Pecic v. U.S., 
475 U.S. 1110 (1986); United States v. White, 486 F.2d 
204, 206-07 (2d Cir. 1973) (despite prosecutor improp-
erly asserting in closing his own belief in defendant’s 
guilt, twice charging defendant with “lying” and re-
peatedly indicating the defense was “fabricated,” court 
concludes “reversal is not warranted here if we view 
his conduct, as we must, in the context of the entire 
trial”), cert denied, White v. U.S., 415 U.S. 980 (1974); 
Morris v. Burnett, 319 F.3d 1254, 1275 (10th Cir.) (find-
ing that a state evidentiary rule “must sometimes yield 
to the constitutional right to present a defense”), cert. 
denied, Morris v. Ortiz, 540 U.S. 909 (2003). 
 The Kentucky Supreme Court has broadly held 
that counsel may not present a full defense if their the-
ory of the case turns entirely on witness credibility. 
Without clarity from this Court, many defendants will 
be forced to choose whether to risk a mistrial by open-
ing with their best arguments, or to follow the Ken-
tucky Supreme Court’s rule and hope the jury will 
discern those arguments on their own over the course 
of the trial, or, worse, be forced to accept a plea agree-
ment despite their innocence.  
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 The fact that the question presented arises in the 
context of an opening statement means that this issue 
will only rarely present itself so neatly in the future. 
This Court will only have another opportunity to re-
view this specific issue in the small percentage of cases 
in which counsel’s opening statement is deemed to vi-
olate a rule against witness impeachment and a mis-
trial results.2 Because it is more likely that defense 
counsel will obediently conform to the new rule and 
thus sacrifice the fullness of their clients’ defenses in 
order to avoid a mistrial, there will be few opportuni-
ties to test the rule via appeal. Furthermore, not being 
able to present a full defense in cases based only on the 
testimony of an accuser may result in more pre-trial 
plea agreements, again robbing the appellate system 
of opportunities to review the rule. 
---------------------------------  --------------------------------- 
 
 
 2 It is possible that opportunities could arise in cases where 
counsel attempts to refer to an anticipated defense that the pros-
ecution’s witnesses are untruthful, objects to the trial court’s ad-
verse ruling, and preserves the issue for appeal. However, because 
the instant petition comes to the Court in the context of a mistrial, 
it raises the issue with far greater clarity than a case appealed 
after trial is likely to present to this Court. Myriad questions may 
arise during trial that could make it unclear whether the court’s 
ruling limiting the opening statement was determinative, and as 
such, cloud the case as an appropriate vehicle for addressing the 
issue. See, e.g., Rogers v. United States, 522 U.S. 252 (1998) (dis-
missing writ of certiorari as improvidently granted in case in 
which instruction given to the jury at trial meant that the case 
did not squarely present the constitutional issue which the Court 
had granted for review). 
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CONCLUSION 
 This Court should grant review and reverse in or-
der to resolve a jurisdictional conflict that undermines 
fundamental protections inscribed by the Framers in 
our Constitution to check the exercise of concentrated 
government power against individuals, their lives, and 
their liberty.  
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